James Winthrop: Agrippa XIX
To the Massachusetts Convention.
In my last address I ascertained. from historical records, the following principles: that. in the original state of government, the whole power resides in the whole body of the nation; that when a people appoint certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power; that a constitution is not itself a bill of rights; and that, whatever is the form of government. a bill of rights is essential to the security of the persons and property of the people. It is an idea favorable to the interest of mankind at large, that government is founded in compact. Several instances may be produced of it; but none is more remarkable than our own. In general I have chosen to apply to such facts as are in the reach of my readers. For this purpose I have chiefly confined myself to examples drawn from the history of our own country, and to the old testament. It is in the power of every reader to verify examples thus substantiated. Even in the remarkable argument on the fourth section, relative to the power over election, I was far from stating the worst of it, as it respects the adverse party. A gentleman, respectable in many points, but more especially for his systematic and perspicuous reasoning in his profession. has repeatedly stated to the Convention among his reasons in favour of that section, that the Rhode-lsland assembly have for a considerable time past had a bill lying on their table for altering the manner of elections for representatives in that state. He has stated it with all the zeal of a person who believed his argument to be a good one. But surely a bill lying on a table can never be considered as any more than an intention to pass it, and nobody pretends that it ever actually did pass. It is in strictness only the intention of a part of the assembly, for nobody can aver that it ever will pass. I write not with an intention to deceive, but that the whole argument may be stated fairly. Much eloquence and ingenuity have been employed in shewing that side of the argument in favour of the proposed constitution; but it ought to be considered that if we accept it upon mere verbal explanations, we shall find ourselves deceived. I appeal to the knowledge of every one, if it does not frequently happen, that a law is interpreted in practice very differently from the intention of the legislature. Hence arises the necessity of acts to amend and explain former acts. This is not an inconvenience in the common and ordinary business of legislation; but is a great one in a constitution. A constitution is a legislative act of the whole people. It is an excellence that it should be permanent, otherwise we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctuation of government. We should be in the same situation as under absolute government, sometimes exposed to the pressure of greater, and sometimes unprotected by the weaker power in the sovereign.
It is now generally understood, that it is for the security of the people, that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches. By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus manifested, where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the same act. but the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in other respects. AS in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the business. All human capacities are limited to a narrow space; and as no individual is capable of practicing a great variety of trades, no single legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of the judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence arises the necessity of a division of the business into national and local. Each department ought to have all the powers necessary for executing its own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us from any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is often asked against whom in a government by representation is a bill of rights to secure us? I answer, that such a government is indeed a government by ourselves; but as a just government protects all alike, it is necessary that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made, and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of the majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor Adams in his learned defence of the American constitutions, that unbridled passions produce the same effect whether in a king, nobility, or a mob. The experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our state constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present confederation has also done it.
I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not amending the confederation, though I have weighed the argument with candour. I think it would be much easier to amend it than the new constitution. But this is a point on which men of very respectable character differ. There is another point in which nearly all agree. and that is. that the new constitution would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. Here the question is not so much what the amendments ought to be, as in what manner they shall be made; whether they shall be made as conditions of our accepting the constitution, or whether we shall first accept it, and then try to amend it. I can hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a question. If the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands, be negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction remains that amendments are necessary; the next question will be, what amendments shall be made? Here permit an individual, who glories in being a citizen of Massachusetts. and who is anxious that the|her?] character may remain undiminished, to propose such articles as appear to him necessary for preserving the rights of the state, He means not to retract any thing with regard to the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting the new one totally; but only to make a proposition which he thinks comprehends the general idea of all parties. if the new constitution means no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no objection to affixing a declaration in favour of the rights of states and of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted upon it—
Resolved, (hat the constitution lately proposed for the United States be received only upon the following conditions:
1. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or manner of elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not exceeding the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one year.
2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse between the states. nor to levy any direct tax on polls or estates, or any excise.
3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a state and citizens of another state. nor between citizens of different states; nor to make any laws relative to the transfer of property between those parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in the body of any state.
4. It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own laws, except laws impairing contracts. which shall not be made at all.
5. Congress shall not incorporate any trading companies, nor alienate the territory of any state. And no treaty, ordinance or law of the United States shall be valid for these purposes.
6. Each state shall have the command of its own militia.
7. No continental army shall come within the limits of any state, other than garrison to guard the publick stores. without the consent of such states in time of peace.
8. The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but one year, and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every year.
In contrast to No. 8, see Federalist No. 71
9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases in which ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, to offences committed upon the high seas, to the capture of prizes, and to cases in which a foreigner residing in some foreign country shall be a party, and an American state or citizen shall be the other party; provided no suit shall be brought upon a state note.
10. Every state may emit bills of credit without making them a tender, and may coin money. of silver, gold or copper, according to the continental standard.
11. No powers shall be exercised by Congress or the president but such as are expressly given by this constitution and not excepted against by this declaration. And any office [officer?] of the United States offending against an individual state shall be held accountable to such state as any other citizen would be.
12. No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt by authority of the state in which the debt shall be due.
13. Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of the benefit of the bill of rights established by the constitution of the state in which he shall reside, and such bills of rights shall be considered as valid in any court of the United States where they shall be pleaded.
14. In all those causes which are triable before the continental courts, the trial by jury shall be held sacred.
These at present appear to me the most important points to be guarded. I have mentioned a reservation of excise to the separate states, because it is necessary, that they should have some way to discharge their own debts, and because it is placing them in an humiliating & disgraceful situation to depute them to transact the business of internal government without the means to carry in on. It is necessary also, as a check on the national government, for it has hardly been known that any government having the powers of war, peace, and revenue, has failed to engage in needless and wanton expense. A reservation of this kind is therefore necessary to preserve the importance of the state governments: without this the extremes of the empire will in a very short time sink into the same degradation and contempt with respect to the middle state as Ireland, Scotland. & Wales, are in with regard to England. All the men of genius and wealth will resort to the seat of government, that will be center of revenue, and of business. which the extremes will be drained to supply.
This is not mere vision, it is justified by the whole course of things. We shall therefore, if we neglect the present opportunity to secure ourselves, only encrease the number of proofs, already too many, that mankind are incapable of enjoying their liberty. I have been the more particular in stating the amendments to be made, because many gentlemen think it would be preferable to receive the new system with corrections. I have by this means brought the corrections into one view, and shewn several of the principal points in which it is unguarded. As it is agreed, at least professedly, on all sides. that those rights should be guarded, it is among the inferiour questions in what manner it is done, provided it is absolutely and effectually done. For my own part, I am fully of opinion, that it would be best to reject this plan, and pass an explicit resolve, defining the powers of Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and foreign nations. under such restrictions as shall render their regulations equal in all parts of the empire. The impost. if well collected, would be fully equal to the interest of the foreign debt, and the current changes of the national government. It is evidently for our interest that the charges should be as small as possible. It is also for our interest that the western lands should, as fast as possible, be applied to the purpose of paying the home debt. Internal taxation and that fund have already paid two thirds of the whole debt, notwithstanding the embarrassments usual at the end of a war.
We are now rising fast above our difficulties, every thing at home has the appearance of improvement, government is well established, manufactures increasing rapidly, and trade expanding, Till since the peace we never sent a ship to India, and the present year, it is said, sends above a dozen vessels from this state only, to the countries round the Indian ocean. Vast quantities of our produce are exported to those countries. It has been so much the practice of European nations to farm out this branch of trade, that we ought to be exceedingly jealous of our right. The manufactures of the state probably exceed in value one million pounds, for the last year. Most of the useful and some ornamental fabricks are established. There is great danger of these improvements being injured unless we practice extreme caution at setting out. It will always be for the interest of the southern states to raise a revenue from the more commercial ones. It is said that the consumer pays it; But does not a commercial state consume more foreign goods than a landed one? The people are more crouded, and of consequence the land is less able to support them. We know it is to be a favourite system to raise the money where it is. But the money is to be expended at another place, and is therefore so much withdrawn annually from our stock. This is a single instance of the difference of interest; it would be very easy to produce others. Innumerable are the differences of manners, and these produce differences in the laws. Uniformity in legislation is of no more importance than in religion; Yet the framers of this new constitution did not even think it necessary that the president should believe that there is a God. although they require an oath of him. It would be easy to shew the propriety of a general declaration upon that subject. But this paper is already extended too far.
Another reason which I had in stating the amendments to be made, was to shew how nearly those who are for admitting the system with the necessary alterations, agree with those who are for rejecting this system and amending the confederation. In point of convenience, the confederation amended would be infinitely preferable to the proposed constitution. In amending the former, we know the powers granted, and are subject to no perplexity; but in reforming the latter, the business is excessively intricate, and great part of the checks on Congress are lost. It is to be remembered too, that if you are so far charmed with eloquence, and misled by fair representations and charitable constructions, as to adopt an undefined system, there will be no saying afterwards that you were mistaken, and wish to correct it. It will then be the constitution of our country, and entitled to defence. If Congress should chuse to avail themselves of a popular commotion to continue in being, as the fourth section justifies, and as the British parliament has repeatedly done, the only answer will be, that it is the constitution of our country, and the people chose it. It is therefore necessary to be exceedingly critical. Whatsoever way shall be chosen to secure our rights, the same resolve ought to contain the whole system of amendment. If it is rejected, the resolve should contain the amendations of the old system; and if accepted, it should contain the corrections of the new one.