The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) prohibited
States from disclosing or selling a driver's personal information
without the driver's consent. Data sold by the States had often fallen
into the wrong hands and, in at least one case, had resulted in the
murder of a woman who was being stalked. South Carolina, led by
Attorney General Condon, sued to block enforcement of the act. The
District Court and Court of Appeals ruled for the State, and United
States Attorney General Janet Reno asked the Supreme Court to reverse
this decision. The issue at the heart of the case was the safety of
individuals and, in turn, their right to privacy.
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress had the authority to enact
the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), because the act regulates
the States as owners of motor vehicle databases that are used in
interstate commerce. The Constitution, in Article I, gives Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court. He reasoned that the personal identification information that
the DPPA regulates is considered an item in interstate commerce. The
States sell the information to companies which are themselves engaged
in interstate commerce. “Because drivers' information is, in
this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the
interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional
regulation.” Rehnquist also refuted South Carolina's argument
that the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment, which grants all powers to
the States that the Constitution does not specifically associate with
the Federal Government. “The DPPA regulates the States as the
owners of databases. It does not require the South Carolina
Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require
State officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes
regulating private individuals.”
In the 1990s, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a series of majority
opinions regarding the powers reserved to the States. He authored
United States v. Lopez,
1995, where the Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its
authority when it adopted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it
a crime to possess a firearm in a school zone. The Chief Justice
concluded that possession of a firearm did not have an economic basis
that would bring it within the scope of the Interstate Commerce
Clause.
In United States
v. Morrison, 2000, the Supreme Court invalidated
the federal Violence Against Women Act. The act gave women the right
to bring suit in federal court in cases of gender-related
violence. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “gender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense, economic activity.”
Although violent crimes against women may ultimately have an effect on
national employment and on the economy, that does not provide
sufficient grounds for the federal government to regulate it under the
Commerce Clause. “The Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.…Indeed, we can
think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.”
Information Please®, ©2005 Pearson Education, Inc. All Rights Reserved.