Monday, December 31, 1787
To the Hon. Gentlemen Chosen to Serve in the State Convention.
[11]
Gentlemen,
When the deputies of a free people are met to deliberate on a
constitution for their country; they must find themselves in a
solemn situation. Few persons realize the greatness of this business,
and none can certainly determine how it will terminate. A
love of liberty in which we have all been educated, and which
your country expects on you to preserve sacred, will doubtless
make you careful not to lay such foundations as will terminate
in despotism. Oppression and a loss of liberty arise from very
different causes, and which at first blush appear totally different
from another.
If you had only to guard against vesting an undue power in
certain great officers of state your work would be comparatively
easy. This some times occasions a loss of liberty, but the
history of nations teacheth us that for one instance from this
cause, there are ten from the contrary, a want of necessary power
in some public department to protect and to preserve the true
interests of the people. America is at this moment in ten-fold
greater danger of slavery than ever she was from the councils
of a British monarchy, or the triumph of British arms. She
is in danger from herself and her own citizens, not from giving
too much, but from denying all power to her rulers—not from a
constitution on despotic principles, but from having no constitution
at all. Should this great effort to organize the empire prove
abortive, heaven only knows the situation in which we shall find
ourselves; but there is reason to fear it will be troublesome enough.
It is awful to meet the passions of a people who not only believe
but feel themselves uncontrouled—who not finding from government
the expected protection of their interests, tho' otherwise
honest, become desperate, each man determining to share by the
spoils of anarchy, what he would wish to acquire by industry under
an efficient national protection. It becomes the deputies of
the people to consider what will be the consequence of a miscarriage
in this business. Ardent expectation is waiting for its
issue—all allow something is necessary—thousands of sufferers
have stifled their rights in reverence to the public effort—the industrious
classes of men are waiting with patience for better
times, and should that be rejected on which they make dependance,
will not the public convulsion be great? Or if the civil
state should survive the first effects of disappointment, what will
be the consequences of slower operations? The men who have
done their best to give relief, will despair of success, and gloomily
determine that greater sufferings must open the eyes of the
deluded—the men who oppose, tho' they may claim a temporary
triumph, will find themselves totally unable to propose, and much
less to adopt a better system; the narrowness of policy that they
have pursued will instantly appear more ridiculous than at present,
and the triumph will spoil that importance, which nature designed
them to receive not by succeeding, but by impeding
national councils. These men cannot, therefore, be the saviours
of their country. While those who have been foremost in the
political contention disappear either thro' despondence or neglect,
every man will do what is right in his own eyes and his hand
will be against his neighbor—industry will cease—the states will
be filled with jealousy—some opposing and others endeavoring
to retaliate—a thousand existing factions, and acts of public injustice,
thro' the temporary influence of parties, will prepare the
way for chance to erect a government, which might now be established
by deliberate wisdom. When government thus arises,
it carries an iron hand.
Should the states reject a union upon solid and efficient principles,
there needs but some daring genius to step forth, and
impose an authority which future deliberation never can correct.
Anarchy, or a want of such government as can protect the interests
of the subjects against foreign and domestic injustice, is the
worst of all conditions. It is a condition which mankind will
not long endure. To avoid its distress they will resort to any
standard which is erected, and bless the ambitious usurper as a
messenger sent by heaven to save a miserable people. We must
not depend too much on the enlightened state of the country; in
deliberation this may preserve us, but when deliberation proves
abortive, we are immediately to calculate on other principles, and
enquire to what may the passions of men lead them, when they
have deliberated to the utmost extent of patience, and been foiled
in every measure, by a set of men who think their emoluments
more safe upon a partial system, than upon one which regards
the national good.
Politics ought to be free from passion—we ought to have
patience for a certain time with those who oppose a federal system.
But have they not been indulged until the state is on the
brink of ruin, and they appear stubborn in error? Have they
not been our scourge and the perplexers of our councils for
many years? Is it not thro' their policy that the state of New
York draws an annual tribute of forty thousand pounds from the
citizens of Connecticut? Is it not by their means that our foreign
trade is ruined, and the farmer unable to command a just
price for his commodities? The enlightened part of the people
have long seen their measures to be destructive, and it is only
the ignorant and jealous who give them support. The men who
oppose this constitution are the same who have been unfederal
from the beginning. They were as unfriendly to the old confederation
as to the system now proposed, but bore it with more patience
because it was wholly inefficacious. They talk of amendments
—of dangerous articles which must be corrected—that
they will heartily join in a safe plan of federal government;
but when we look on their past conduct can we think them sincere?
Doubtless their design is to procrastinate, and by this
carry their own measures; but the artifice must not succeed.
The people are now ripe for a government which will do justice
to their interests, and if the honourable convention deny them,
they will despair of help. They have shewn a noble spirit in appointing
their first citizens for this business—when convened
you will constitute the most august assembly that were ever collected
in the State, and your duty is the greatest that can be expected
from men, the salvation of your country. If coolness and
magnanimity of mind attend your deliberations, all little objections
will vanish, and the world will be more astonished by your
political wisdom than they were by the victory of your arms.
A Landholder.