To the Landholders and Farmers.
To censure a man for an opinion in which he declares himself honest,
and in a matter of which all men have a right to judge, is highly
injurious; at the same time, when the opinions even of honourable men
are submitted to the people, a tribunal before which the meanest
citizen hath a right to speak, they must abide the consequences of
public stricture. We are ignorant whether the honorable gentlemen
possesses state dignities or emoluments which will be endangered by
the new system, or hath motives of personality to prejudice his mind
and throw him into the opposition; or if it be so, do not wish to
evade the objections by such a charge. As a member of the general
Convention, and deputy of a great state, this honorable person hat a
right to speak and be heard, It gives us pleasure to know the extent
of what may be objected or even surmised, by one whose situation was
the best to espy danger, and mark the defective parts of the
constitution, if any such there be. Mr. Gerry, tho' in the character
of an objector, tells us “he was fully convinced that to preserve
the union an efficient government was indispensibly necessary, and
that it would be difficult to make proper amendments to the old
articles of confederation” therefore by his own concession there
was an indispensible necessity of a system, in many particulars
entirely new. He tells us further “that if the people reject this
altogether, anarchy may ensue” and what situation can be pictured
more awful than a total dissolution had better be risked than to fall
back into that state of rude violence, in which every man's hand is
against his neighbour, and there is no judge to decide between them or
power of justice to control. But we hope to show that there are no
such alarming defects in the proposed structure of government, and
that while a public force is created, the liberties of the people
have every possible guard.
Several of the honorable Gentleman's objections are expressed in such
vague and indecisive terms, that they rather deserve the name of
insinuations, and we know not against what particular parts of the
system they are pointed. Others are explicit, and if real deserve
serious attention. His first objection is “that there is no
adequate provision for a representation of the people”. This must
have respect either to the number of representatives, or to the manner
in which they are chosen. The proper number to constitute a safe
representation is a matter of judgement, in which honest and wise men
often disagree. Were it possible for all the people to convene and
give their personal assent, some would think this the best mode of
making laws, but in the present instance it is impracticable. The
state representation is composed of one or two from every town and
district, which composes an assembly not so large as to be unwieldy in
acting nor so expensive as to burden the people. But if so numerous a
representation were made from every part of the United States with our
present population, the new Congress would consist of three thousand
men; with the population of Great Britain to which we may arrive in a
half century, of ten thousand; and with the population of France,
which we shall probably equal in a century and a half, of thirty
thousand.
Such a body of men might be an army to defend the country in case of
foreign invasion, but not a legislature, and the expense to support
them would equal the whole national revenue. By the proposed
constitution the new Congress will consist of nearly one hundred
men. When our population is equal to Great Britain of three hundred
men, and when equal to France of nine hundred. Plenty of Lawgivers!
why any gentlemen should wish for more is inconceivable.
Considering the immense territory of America, the objection with many
will be on the other side; that when this whole is populated it will
constitute a legislature unmanagable by its members. Convention
foreseeing this danger, have so worded the article, that if the people
should at any time judge necessary, they may diminish the
representation.
As the state legislature have to regulate the internal policy, of
every town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have one or
two men, particularly acquainted with every small district of
country, its interests, parties, and passions. But the federal
legislature can take cognizance only of national questions and
interests, which in their very nature are general, and
for this purpose five or ten honest and wise men are chosen from each
stat; men who have had previous experience in state legislation, will
be more competent than an hundred. From an acquaintance with their
own state legislatures, they will always know the sense of the people
at large, and the expence of supporting such a number will be as much
as we ought to incur.
If the Hon. gentleman, in saying “there is no adequate provision
for a representation of the people” refers to the manner of
choosing them, a reply to this is naturally blended with his second
objection “that they have no security for the right of
election” it is impossible to conceive what greater security can
be given, by any form of Words, than we here find.
The federal representatives are to be chosen by the people. Every
freeman is an elector. The same qualifications which enable you to
vote for state representatives, give you federal voice. It is a right
you cannot loose [sic], unless you first annihilate the state
legislature, and declare yourselves incapable of electing, which is a
degree of infatuation improbable as a second deluge to drown the world.
Your own assemblies are to regulate the formalities of this choice,
and unless they betray you, you cannot be betrayed. But perhaps it
may be said, Congress have a power to control this formality as to
the time and place of electing, and we allow they have: But this
objections which at first looks frightful was designed as a guard to
the privileges of the electors. Even state assemblies may have their
madness and passion, this tho' not probable is still possible.
We have a recent instance in the state of Rhode Island, where a
desperate junto are governing, contrary to the sense of a great
majority of the people. It may be the case in any other stare, and
should it ever happen, that the ignorance or rashness of the state
assemblies, in a fit of jealousy should deny you this sacred right,
the deliberate justice of the continent, is enabled to interpose, and
restore you a federal voice. This right is therefore more inviolably
guarded than it can be by the government of your state, for it is
guarenteed by the whole empire. Tho' out of the order in which the
Hon. Gentleman proposes his doubts, I wish here to notice some
opinions which he makes. The proposed plan among others he tells us
involves these questions “whether the several state government, shall
be altered as in effect to be dissolved? Whether in lieu of the state
governments the national constitution now proposed shall be
substituted?” I wish for sagacity to see on what these questions
are founded. No alteration in the state governments is even proposed,
but they are to remain identically the same that they now are. Some
powers are to be given into the hands of your federal
representatives, but these powers are all in their nature general,
such as must be exercised by the whole or not at all, and such as
are absolutely necessary; or your commerce, the price of your
commodities, your riches and your safety will be the sport of every
foreign adventurer. Why are we told of the dissolution of our state
governments, when by this plan the are indissolubly linked. They must
stand or fall, live or die together. The national legislature
consists of two houses, a senate and a house of Representative. The
senate is to be chosen by the assemblies of the particular states; so
that if the assemblies are dissolved, the senate dissolves with
them. The national representatives are to be chosen by the same
electors, and under the same qualifications, as choose state
representatives; so that if the state representation be dissolved,
the national representation is gone of course.
State representation and government is the very basis of the
congressional power proposed. This is the most valuable link in the
chain of connexion, and affords double security for the rights of the
people. Your liberties are pledged to you by your own state, and by
the power of the whole empire. You have a voice in the government of
your own state, and in the government of the whole. Were not the
gentleman on whom the remarks are made very honourable, and the
eminence of office raised above a suspicion of cunning, we should
think he had, in this instance, insinuated merely to alarm the fears
of the people. His other objections will be mentioned in some future
number of the
Landholder
