Thursday, November 22, 1787
To the People of Connecticut.
It is fortunate that you have been but little distressed with that
torrent of impertinence and folly, with which the newspaper politicians
have over whelmed many parts of our country.
It is enough that you should have heard, that one party has seriously
urged, that we should adopt the New Constitution
because it has been approved by Washington and
Franklin: and the other, with all the solemnity
of apostolic address to Men, Brethren, Fathers, Friends and
Countryman, have urged that we should reject, as dangerous,
every clause thereof, because that Washington is
more used to command as a soldier, than to reason as a
politician—Franklin is old, others are
young—and Wilson is
haughty.[1] You are too well
informed to decide by the opinion of others, and too independent to
need a caution against undue influence.
Of a very different nature, tho' only one degree better than the other
reasoning, is all that sublimity of nonsense and
alarm, that has been thundered against it in
every shape of metaphoric terror, on the subject
of a bill of rights, the liberty of the
press, rights of conscience, rights of taxation and election, trials
in the vicinity, freedom of speech, trial by jury, and a
standing army. These last are undoubtedly
important points, much too important to depend on mere paper
protection. For, guard such privileges by the strongest expressions,
still if you leave the legislative and executive power in the hands of
those who are or may be disposed to deprive you of them—you are
but slaves. Make an absolute monarch—give him the supreme
authority, and guard as much as you will by bills of rights, your
liberty of the press, and trial by jury;—he will find means
either to take them from you, or to render them useless.
The only real security that you can have for all your important rights
must be in the nature of your government. If you suffer any man to
govern you who is not strongly interested in supporting your
privileges, you will certainly lose them. If you are about to trust
your liberties with people whom it is necessary to bind by
stipulation, that they shall not keep a standing army, your
stipulation is not worth even the trouble of writing. No bill of
rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than the
honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the
rulers were interested in preserving the rights;
and in that case they have always been ready enough to declare the
rights, and to preserve them when they were declared.—The famous
English Magna Charta is but an act of parliament,
which every subsequent parliament has had just as much constitutional
power to repeal and annul, as the parliament which made it had to pass
it at first. But the security of the nation has always been, that
their government was so formed, that at least one
branch of their legislature must be strongly interested to
preserve the rights of the nation.
You have a bill of rights in Connecticut (i.e.) your legislature many
years since enacted that the subjects of this state should enjoy
certain privileges. Every assembly since that time, could, by the
same authority, enact that the subjects should enjoy none of those
privileges; and the only reason that it has not long since been so
enacted, is that your legislature were as strongly interested in
preserving those rights as any of the subjects; and this is your only
security that it shall not be so enacted at the next session of
assembly: and it is security enough.
Your General Assembly under your present constitution are
supreme. They may keep troops on foot in the most profound
peace, if they think proper. They have heretofore abridged the
trial by jury in some cases, and they can again in all. They can
restrain the press, and may lay the most burdensome taxes if they
please, and who can forbid? But still the people are perfectly
safe that not one of these events shall take place so long as the
members of the General Assembly are as much interested, and interested
in the same manner, as the other subjects.
On examining the new proposed constitution, there can be no
question but that there is authority enough lodged in the proposed
Federal Congress, if abused, to do the greatest injury.
And it is perfectly idle to object to it, that there is no bill of
rights, or to propose to add to it a provision that a trial by jury
shall in no case be omitted, or to patch it up by adding a stipulation
in favor of the press, or to guard it by removing the paltry
objection to the right of Congress to regulate the time and manner
of elections.
If you cannot prove by the best of all evidence, viz., by the interest
of the rulers, that this authority will not be abused, or at
least that those powers are not more likely to be abused by the
Congress, than by those who now have the same powers, you
must by no means adopt the constitution:—No, not with all the
bills of rights and with all the stipulations in favor of the people
that can be made.
But if the members of Congress are to be interested just as you
and I are, and just as the members of our present legislatures are
interested, we shall be just as safe, with even supreme power (if
that were granted) in Congress, as in the General Assembly. If
the members of Congress can take no improper step which will
not affect them as much as it does us, we need not apprehend
that they will usurp authorities not given them to injure that
society of which they are a part.
The sole question, (so far as any apprehension of tyranny and
oppression is concerned) ought to be, how are Congress formed? how
far have you a control over them? Decide this, and then all the
questions about their power may be dismissed for the amusement of
those politicians whose business it is to catch flies, or may
occasionally furnish subjects for George Bryan's
Pomposity, or the declamations of
Cato—An Old
Whig—Son of
Liberty—
Brutus—Brutus
junior—An Officer of the Continental
Army, —the more contemptible
Timoleon, and the residue of that rabble of
writers.