How Will the New Government Raise Money?
Abstract
In this
essay, from an Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, Cincinnatus
responds to James Wilson's statements about Congress' powers to tax under the
Constitution. It appeared in the November 29 and December 6, 1787, New-York
Journal, as reprinted from a Philadelphia newspaper.
by Cincinnatus
On the subject of taxation, in which powers are to be given so
largely by the new constitution, you [James Wilson of Pennsylvania] lull our
fears of abuse by venturing to predict "that the great revenue of the
United States must, and always will, be raised by impost"—and you elevate
our hopes by holding out, "the reviving and supporting the national
credit." If you have any other plan for this, than by raising money upon
the people to pay the interest of the national debt, your ingenuity will deserve
our thanks. Supposing however, that raising money is necessary to payment of the
interest, and such a payment [is] requisite to support the credit of the
union—let us see how much will be necessary for that end, and how far the impost
will supply what we want. The arrearages of French and Spanish interest amount
now to—1,500,000 dollars; Interest and installments of do. for 1788—850,227;
Support of government; and its departments, for 1788—500,000; Arrears and
anticipations of 1787—300,000; Interest of domestic debt—500,000 {total}
4,650,227 [3,650,227]
The new Congress then, supposing it to get into operation
towards October, 1788, will have to provide for this sum, and for the additional
sum of 3,000,000 at least for the ensuing year; which together will make the sum
of 7,650,227 [6,650,227].
Now let us see how the impost will answer this. Congress have
furnished us with their estimate of the produce of the whole imports of America
at five per cent and that is 800,000 dollars. There will remain to provide for,
by other taxes, 6,850,227 [5,850,227].
We know too, that our imports diminish yearly, and from the
nature of things must continue to diminish; and consequently that the above
estimate of the produce of the impost, will in all probability fall much short
of the supposed sum. But even without this, it must appear that you [were]
either intentionally misleading your hearers, or [were] very little acquainted
with the subject when you ventured to predict that the great revenue of the
United States would always flow from the impost. The estimate above is from the
publications of Congress, and I presume is right. But the sum stated, necessary
to be raised by the new government, in order to answer the expectations they
have raised, is not all. The state debts, independent of what each owes to the
United States, amount to about 30,000,000 dollars; the annual interest of this
is 1,000,000.
It will be expected that the new government will provide for
this also; and such expectation is founded, not only on the promise you hold
forth, of its reviving and supporting public credit among us, but also on this
unavoidable principle of justice—that is, the new government takes away the
impost, and other substantial taxes, from the produce of which the several
states paid the interest of their debt, or funded the paper with which they paid
it. The new government must find ways and means of supplying that deficiency, .
. . in hard money, for … paper … cannot [be used] without a violation of
the principles it boasts. The sum then which it must annually raise in specie,
after the first year, cannot be less than 4,800,000. At present there is not one
half of this sum in specie raised in all the states. And yet the complaints of
intolerable taxes has produced one rebellion and will be mainly operative in the
adoption of your constitution. How you will get this sum is inconceivable and
yet get it you must, or lose all credit. With magnificent promises you have
bought golden opinions of all sorts of people, and with gold you must answer
them, …
To satisfy [our fellow citizens] more fully on the subject of
the revenue, that is to be raised upon them, in order to give enormous fortunes
to the jobbers in public securities, I shall lay before them a proposition to
Congress, from Mr. Robert Morris, when superintendent of finance. It is dated, I
think,' the 29th of June, 1782, and is in these words:
[1 say, I think, because by accident the month is erased in the
note I have, and I have not access to public papers which would enable me to
supply the defect.]
"The requisition of a five per cent impost, made on the 3d
of February, 1781, has not yet been complied with by the state of Rhode Island,
but as there is reason to believe, that their compliance is not far off, this
revenue may be considered as already granted. It will, however, be very
inadequate to the purposes intended. If goods be imported, and prizes introduced
to the amount of twelve millions annually, the five per cent would be six
hundred thousand, from which at least one sixth must be deducted, as well for
the cost of collection as for the various defalcations which will necessarily
happen, and which it is unnecessary to enumerate. It is not safe therefore, to
estimate this revenue at more than half a million of dollars; for though it may
produce more, yet probably it will not produce so much. It was in consequence of
this, that on the 27th day of February last, I took the liberty to submit the
propriety of asking the states for a land tax of one dollar for every hundred
acres of land—a poll-tax of one dollar on all freemen, and all male slaves,
between sixteen and sixty, excepting such as are in the federal army, or by
wounds or otherwise rendered unfit for service—and an excise of one eighth of a
dollar, on all distilled spiritous liquors. Each of these may be estimated at
half a million; and should the product be equal to the estimation, the sum total
of revenues for funding the public debts, would be equal to two millions."
You will readily perceive, Mr. Wilson, that there is a vast
difference between your prediction and your friend's proposition. Give me leave
to say, sir, that it was not discreet, in you, to speak upon finance without
instructions from this great financier. Since, independent of its delusive
effect upon your audience, it may excite his jealousy, lest you should have a
secret design of rivalling him in the expected office of superintendent under
the new constitution. It is true, there is no real foundation for it; but then
you know jealousy makes the food it feeds on. A quarrel between two such able
and honest friends to the United States, would, I am persuaded, be felt as a
public calamity. I beseech you then to be very tender upon this point in your
next harangue. And if four months' study will not furnish you with sufficient
discretion, we will indulge you with six.
It may be said, that let the government be what it may, the sums
I have stated must be raised, and the same difficulties exist. This is not
altogether true. For first, we are now in the way of paying the interest of the
domestic debt, with paper, which under the new system is utterly reprobated.
This makes a difference between the specie to be raised of 1,800,000 dollars per
annum. If the new government raises this sum in specie on the people, it will
certainly support public credit, but it will overwhelm the people. It will give
immense fortunes to the speculators; but it will grind the poor to dust.
Besides, the present government is now redeeming the principal of the domestic
debt by the sale of western lands. But let the full interest be paid in specie,
and who will part with the principal for those lands? A principal, which having
been generally purchased for two shillings and six pence on the pound, will
yield to the holders two hundred and forty per cent. This paper system
therefore, though in general an evil, is in this instance attended with the
great benefit of enabling the public to cancel a debt upon easy terms, which has
been swelled to its enormous size, by as enormous impositions. And the new
government, by promising too much, will involve itself in a disreputable breach
of faith.…
The present government promises nothing; the intended
government, everything. From the present government little is expected; from the
intended one, much. Because it is conceived that to the latter much is given; to
the former, little. And yet the inability of the people to pay what is required
in specie, remaining the same, the funds of the one will not much exceed those
of the other. The public creditors are easy with the present government from a
conviction of its inability [to pay]. They will be urgent with the new one from
an opinion, that as is promised, so it can and will perform every thing. Whether
the change will be for our prosperity and honor, is yet to be tried. Perhaps it
will be found, that the supposed want of power in Congress to levy taxes is, at
present a veil happily thrown over the inability of the people; and that the
large powers given to the new government will, to every one, expose the
nakedness of our land. Certain it is, that if the expectations which are grafted
on the gift of those plenary powers, are not answered, our credit will be
irretrievably ruined.
CINCINNATUS