Do Checks and Balances Really Secure the Rights of the People?
by
This satire is from a pamphlet of "ARISTOCROTIS", The Government of
Nature Delineated; Or An Exact Picture of the New Federal Constitution
(Carlisle, PA, 1788)
The present is an active period. Europe is in a ferment breaking their
constitutions; America is in a similar state, making a constitution. For this
valuable purpose a convention was appointed, consisting of such as excelled in
wisdom and knowledge, who met in Philadelphia last May. For my own part, I was
so smitten with the character of the members, that I had assented to their
production, while it was yet in embryo. And I make no doubt but every good
republican did so too. But how great was my surprise, when it appeared with such
a venerable train of names annexed to its tail, to find some of the people under
different signatures—such as Centinel, Old Whig, Brutus, etc.—daring to oppose
it, and that too with barefaced arguments, obstinate reason and stubborn truth.
This is certainly a piece of the most extravagant impudence to presume to
contradict the collected wisdom of the United States; or to suppose a body, who
engrossed the whole wisdom of the continent, was capable of erring. I expected
the superior character of the convention would have secured it from profane
sallies of a plebeian's pen; and its inherent infallibility debarred the
interference of impertinent reason or truth. It was too great an act of
condescension to permit the people, by their state conventions, "to assent
and ratify," what the grand convention prescribed to them; but to inquire
into its principles, or investigate its properties, was a presumption too daring
to escape resentment. Such licentious conduct practised by the people, is a
striking proof of our feeble governments, and calls aloud for the pruning knife,
i.e., the establishment of some proper plan of discipline. This the convention,
in the depth of their united wisdom hath prescribed, which when established,
will certainly put a stop to the growing evil. A consciousness of this, is, no
doubt, the cause which stimulates the people to oppose it with so much
vehemence. They deprecate the idea of being confined within their proper sphere;
they cannot endure the thought of being obliged to mind their own business, and
leave the affairs of government to those whom nature hath destined to rule. I
say nature, for it is a fundamental principle, as clear as an axiom, that nature
hath placed proper degrees and subordinations amongst mankind and ordained a
few(1) to rule, and many to obey. I am not obliged to prove this principle
because it would be madness in the extreme to attempt to prove a self-evident
truth.
(1) If any person is so stupidly dull as not to discern who these few are, I
would refer such to nature herself for information. Let them observe her ways
and be wise. Let them mark those men whom she hath endued with the necessary
qualifications of authority; such as the dictatorial air, the magisterial voice,
the imperious tone, the haughty countenance, the lofty look, the majestic mien.
Let them consider those whom she hath taught to command with authority, but
comply with disgust; to be fond of sway, but impatient of control; to consider
themselves as Gods, and all the rest of mankind as two legged brutes. Now it is
evident that the possessors of these divine qualities must have been ordained by
nature to dominion and empire; for it would be blasphemy against her supreme
highness to suppose that she confers her gifts in vain. Fortune hath also
distinguished those upon whom nature hath imprinted the lineaments of authority.
She hath heaped her favors and lavished her gifts upon those very persons whom
nature delighteth to honor. Indeed, instinct hath taught those men that
authority is their natural right, and therefore they grasp at it with an
eagerness bordering on rapacity.
But with all due submission to the infallible wisdom of the grand convention,
let me presume to examine whether they have not, in the new plan of government,
inviolably adhered to this supreme principle.…
In article first, section first, of the new plan, it is declared that
"all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States which shall consist of a Senate"—very right, quite agreeable
to nature and House of Representatives"—not quite so right. This is a
palpable compliance with the humors and corrupt practices of the times. But what
follows in section 2 is still worse: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several
states." This is a most dangerous power, and must soon produce fatal and
pernicious consequences, were it not circumscribed and poised by proper checks
and balances. But in this is displayed the unparalleled sagacity of the august
convention: that when such bulwarks of prejudice surrounded the evil, so as to
render it both difficult and dangerous to attack it by assault and storm, they
have invested and barricaded it so closely as will certainly deprive it of its
baneful influence and prevent its usual encroachments. They have likewise
stationed their miners and sappers so judiciously, that they will certainly, in
process of time, entirely reduce and demolish this obnoxious practice of popular
election. There is a small thrust given to it in the body of the conveyance
itself. The term of holding elections is every two years; this is much better
than the detestable mode of annual elections, so fatal to energy. However, if
nothing more than this were done, it would still remain an insupportable
inconvenience. But in section 4 it is provided that congress by law may alter
and make such regulations with respect to the times, places, and manner of
holding elections, as to them seemeth fit and proper. This is certainly a very
salutary provision, most excellently adapted to counterbalance the great and
apparently dangerous concessions made to the plebeians in the first and second
sections. With such a prudent restriction as this they are quite harmless: no
evil can arise from them if congress have only the sagacity and fortitude to
avail themselves of the power they possess by this section. For when the stated
term (for which the primary members was elected) is nigh expired, congress may
appoint [the] next election to be held in one place in each state; and so as not
to give the rabble needless disgust, they may appoint the most central place for
that purpose. They can never be at a loss for an ostensible reason to vary and
shift from place to place until they may fix it at any extremity of the state it
suits. This will be the business of the senate, to observe the particular places
in each state, where their influence is most extensive, and where the
inhabitants are most obsequious to the will of their superiors, and there
appoint the elections to be held. By this means, such members will be returned
to the house of representatives (as it is called) as the president and senate
shall be pleased to recommend; and they no doubt will recommend such gentlemen
only as are distinguished by some peculiar federal feature—so that unanimity and
concord will shine conspicuous through every branch of government. This section
is ingeniously calculated, and must have been intended by the convention, to
exterminate electioneering entirely. For by putting the time of election in the
hands of congress they have thereby given them a power to perpetuate themselves
when they shall find it safe and convenient to make the experiment. For though a
preceding clause says, "that representatives shall be chosen for two years,
and senators for six years," yet this clause being subsequent annuls the
former, and puts it in the power of congress, (when some favorable juncture
intervenes) to alter the time to four and twelve years. This cannot be deemed an
unconstitutional stretch of power, for the constitution in express terms puts
the time of holding elections in their power, and certainly they are the proper
judges when to exert that power. Thus by doubling the period from time to time,
its extent will soon be rendered coeval with the life of man. And it is but a
very short and easy transition from this to hereditary succession, which is most
agreeable to the institutions of nature, who in all her works, hath ordained the
descendant of every species of beings to succeed its immediate progenitor, in
the same actions, ends and order.
The indefatigable laborious ass never aspires to the honors, nor assumes the
employment of the sprightly warlike steed, nor does he ever pretend that it is
his right to succeed him in all his offices and dignities, because he bears some
resemblance to the defunct in his figure and nature. The llama, though useful
enough for the purposes for which he was intended by nature, is every way
incompetent to perform the offices of the elephant; nor does he ever pretend to
usurp his elevated station. Every species of beings, animate and inanimate, seem
fully satisfied with the station assigned them by nature. But perverse,
obstinate man, he alone spurns at her institutions, and inverts her order.' He
alone repines at his situation, and endeavors to usurp the station of his
superiors. But this digression has led me from the subject in hand.…
(2) This is only to be understood of the inferior class of mankind. The
superior order have aspiring feelings given them by nature, such as ambition,
emulation, etc., which makes it their duty to persevere in the pursuit of
gratifying these refined passions.
The next object that presents itself is the power which the new constitution
gives to congress to regulate the manner of elections. The common practice of
voting at present is by ballot. By this mode it is impossible for a gentleman to
know how he is served by his dependent, who may be possessed of a vote.
Therefore this mode must be speedily altered for that viva voce, which will
secure to a rich man all the votes of his numerous dependents and friends and
their dependents. By this means he may command any office in the gift of the
people, which he pleases to set up for. This will answer a good end while
electioneering exists; and will likewise contribute something towards its
destruction. A government founded agreeable to nature must be entirely
independent; that is, it must be beyond the reach of annoyance or control from
every power on earth, Now in order to render it thus, several things are
necessary.
The next object that presents itself is the power which the new constitution
gives to congress to regulate the manner of elections. The common practice of
voting at present is by ballot. By this mode it is impossible for a gentleman to
know how he is served by his dependent, who may be possessed of a vote.
Therefore this mode must be speedily altered for that viva voce, which will
secure to a rich man all the votes of his numerous dependents and friends and
their dependents. By this means he may command any office in the gift of the
people, which he pleases to set up for. This will answer a good end while
electioneering exists; and will likewise contribute something towards its
destruction. A government founded agreeable to nature must be entirely
independent; that is, it must be beyond the reach of annoyance or control from
every power on earth, Now in order to render it thus, several things are
necessary.
2dly. It will create and diffuse a spirit of industry among the people. They
will then be obliged to labor for money to pay their taxes. There will be no
trifling from time to time, as is done now. The new government will have energy
sufficient to compel immediate payment.
3dly. This will make the people attend to their own business, and not be
dabbling in politics—things they are entirely ignorant of; nor is it proper
they should understand. But it is very probable that the exercise of this power
may be opposed by the refractory plebeians, who (such is the perverseness of
their natures) often refuse to comply with what is manifestly for their
advantage. But to prevent all inconvenience from this quarter the congress have
power to raise and support armies. This is the second thing necessary to render
government independent. The creatures who compose these armies are a species of
animals, wholly at the disposal of government; what others call their natural
rights they resign into the hands of their superiors—even the right of
self-preservation (so precious to all other beings) they entirely surrender, and
put their very lives in the power of their masters. Having no rights of their
own to care for, they become naturally jealous and envious of those possessed by
others. They are therefore proper instruments in the hands of government to
divest the people of their usurped rights. But the capital business of these
armies will be to assist the collectors of taxes, imposts, and excise, in
raising the revenue; and this they will perform with the greatest alacrity, as
it is by this they are supported; but for this they would be in a great measure
useless; and without this they could not exist.…
From these remarks, I think it is evident, that the grand convention hath
dexterously provided for the removal of every thing that hath ever operated as a
restraint upon government in any place or age of the world. But perhaps some
weak heads may think that the constitution itself will be a check upon the new
congress. But this I deny, for the convention has so happily worded themselves,
that every part of this constitution either bears double meaning, or no meaning
at all; and if any concessions are made to the people in one place, it is
effectually cancelled in another—so that in fact this constitution is much
better and gives more scope to the rulers than they durst safely take if there
was no constitution at all. For then the people might contend that the power was
inherent in them, and that they had made some implied reserves in the original
grant. But now they cannot, for every thing is expressly given away to
government in this plan. Perhaps some people may think that power which the
house of representatives possesses, of impeaching the officers of government,
will be a restraint upon them. But this entirely vanishes, when it is considered
that the senate hath the principal say in appointing these officers, and that
they are the sole judges of all impeachments. Now it would be absurd to suppose
that they would remove their own servants for performing their secret orders. .
. . For the interest of rulers and the ruled will then be two distinct things.
The mode of electing the president is another excellent regulation, most wisely
calculated to render him the obsequious machine of congress. He is to be chosen
by electors appointed in such manner as the state legislators shall direct. But
then the highest in votes cannot be president, without he has the majority of
all the electors; and if none have this majority, then the congress is to choose
the president out of the five highest on the return. By this means the congress
will always have the making of the president after the first election. So that
if the reigning president pleases his masters, he need be under no apprehensions
of being turned out for any severities used to the people, for though the
congress may not have influence enough to procure him the majority of the votes
of the electoral college, yet they will always be able to prevent any other from
having such a majority; and to have him returned among the five highest, so that
they may have the appointing of him themselves. All these wise regulations,
prove to a demonstration, that the grand convention was infallible. The congress
having thus disentangled themselves from all popular checks and choices, and
being supported by a well disciplined army and active militia, will certainly
command dread and respect abroad, obedience and submission at home. They will
then look down with awful dignity and tremendous majesty from the pinnacle of
glory to which fortune has raised them upon the insignificant creatures, their
subjects, whom they have reduced to that state of vassalage and servile
submission, for which they were primarily destined by nature. America will then
be great amongst the nations(3) and princess amongst the provinces. Her fleets
will cover the deserts of the ocean and convert it into a popular city; and her
invincible armies overturn the thrones of princes. The glory of Britain (4)
shall fall like lightning before her puissant arm; when she ariseth to shake the
nations, and take vengeance on all who dare oppose her. O! thou most venerable
and august congress! with what astonishing ideas my mind is ravished! when I
contemplate thy rising grandeur, and anticipate thy future glory! Happy thy
servants! happy thy vassals! and happy thy slaves, which fit under the shade of
thy omnipotent authority, and behold the glory of thy majesty! for such a state
who would not part with ideal blessings of liberty? who would not cheerfully
resign the nominal advantages of freedom? the dazzling splendor of Assyrian,
Persian, Macedonian and Roman greatness will then be totally eclipsed by the
radiant blaze of this glorious western luminary! These beautiful expressions,
aristocracy, and oligarchy, upon which the popular odium hath fixed derision and
contempt, will then resume their natural emphasis; their genuine signification
will be perfectly understood, and no more perverted or abused.
ARISTOCROTIS