(Concluded from our last.)
The Massachusetts Convention
Gentlemen,
This appears to be the universal effect of such establishments. A
point of such magnitude ought, then, to be particularly guarded. In
some respects it is beneficial that a system of commerce should be
established by national authority. But if it is found, as it will upon
examination, that most governments establish those companies. from
occasional and temporal motives. and that they produce ill effects on
government and on trade; the power ought in this respect to be
restrained. As we are situated at one extreme of the empire. two or
three such companies would annihilate the importance of our seaports,
by transferring the trade to Philadelphia. With the decay of trade is
connected the depreciation of lands and estates for want of a market
for the produce. At present our exports are great and our manufactures
are every day rising in importance. It seems to be agreed on all
sides, that from the port of Boston only the balance was last year as
much as an hundred & fifty thousand pounds in favour of the state;
a comparison of that and former years is far from proving the
distressed state of commerce. Complains in that respect are about as
well founded as in most others. They are made to serve a present
purpose, and when that is accomplished, there is no redress for the
disappointment of the publick expectation. It becomes us then to
consider well of the powers before we surrender them. There is no
recovering them when once given. It is vain to flatter ourselves with
the idea, that three quarters of the members of the new government
will ever be for restraining their own power. If it was so easy as the
federalists pretend to procure an alteration of the system after its
adoption, I think, that it is a circumstance not much in its favour.
In order to be perfect a constitution should be permanent. The new
system sets out with a violation of the compact between the states.
While it is in discussion, we ought to consider, that injustice never
can be the basis of a good government. I have met with an account of
one government uniformly supported by that principle, and I do not
wish even my antagonists to become the subjects of that kingdom.
In answer to the favourite remark of the federalists, that what is not
given is reserved, it is sufficient to reply, that the framers of the
proposed constitution have themselves thought it necessary to make an
explicit reservation of the power to grant titles of nobility. Why did
they reserve this point, if it would not otherwise have been given up?
The conversation of the party is in direct opposition to any design
ever to alter the system in favour of the liberties of the people. It
is said that a constitution is itself a bill of rights. The fallacy of
this position is easily shewn, but the length of this paper makes it
necessary to postpone that part of the argument. At present we shall
only observe, that a constitution does not necessarily point out any
other dependencies than of the parts of the government upon each
other, and not those between the government and people. Has Venice no
constitution? Yet the people have no share in the government.
Agrippa.
